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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
IN RE DWIGHT L. KING { Case No. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
(UTAH STATE BAR) 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
F-39 
While respondent agrees that the statement of facts 
submitted by petitioner in the Brief of Petitioner on pages 
1 to 8 inclusive are substantially correct, it would appear 
advisable to call the court's attention to some typographical 
errors which appear therein. On page 3 of Petitioner's 
Brief reference is made to an informal hearing held by the 
Investigating Committee of the Utah State Bar on Novem-
ber 4, 1954. This meeting was held on December 4, 1954 
(Exhibit P-3). On said page 3 reference is made in two 
places to Exhibit T -3, the correct designation of said ex-
hibit being P-3. Also, on page 7 of said brief reference is 
made to Exhibits T-1 through T-6 whereas the correct des-
ignation of said exhibits is P-1 through P-7 (R. 0002). 
In addition to Findings numbered 3 through 6 of the 
Disciplinary Committee set out by petitioner on pages 7 
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and 8 of their brief, respondent calls attention to Finding 
No. 2 of the said Committee which is as follows: 
2. That during the period from June 10, 1954, 
until June 21, 1954, and for some time prior and sub-
sequent thereto, the said Dwight L. King was one 
of counsel for Harsh Utah, a corporation, in a case 
entitled Pacific States Cast Iron Pipe Company, a 
corporation, et al., plaintiffs, vs. Harsh Utah, a Cor-
poration, et al., defendants, Civil No. 5096, brought 
in the District Court of Davis County, State of Utah, 
(R. 0280). 
Also, the Waiver of Notice of the Directors of Harsh 
Utah Corporation and the Minutes of Special Meeting of 
Harsh Utah Corporation are as follows: 
WAIVER OF NOTICE OF DIRECTORS 
OF 
HARSH UTAH CORPORATION 
We, the undersigned, being all of the duly 
elected directors of Harsh Utah Corporation, hereby 
do waive notice of the time and place and purpose 
of a special meeting of the directors of said corpora-
tion and hereby fix the First day of April, 1953, as 
the time and at the office of the Harsh Utah Cor-
poration in Portland, Oregon, as the place for the 
holding of said special meeting of directors, for the 
purpose of considering the return of a contribution 
to the capital surplus of said corporation. 
Dated this 1st day of April, 1953. 
HAROLD SCHNITZER 
WALTER E. HUTCHINSON 
MINUTES OF SPECIAL MEETING OF 
DIRECTORS OF 
HARSH UTAH CORPORATION 
A special meeting of the Board of Directors of 
Harsh Utah Corporation was held at the offices of 
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the corporation in Portland, Oregon, on April 1, 
1953, at 3 :00 o'clock P. M. The meeting was called 
to order by the President, Mr. Harold J. Schnitzer, 
and minutes of such meeting were recorded by the 
Secretary, Mr. Walter E. Hutchinson. 
The President stated that all directors had in 
writing waived notice of said meeting and directed 
that said waiver be attached to the minutes of the 
meeting. 
Mr. Schnitzer then stated that the purpose of 
the meeting was to discuss the return of $624,994.00 
which Mr. Schnitzer had contributed to the capital 
surplus of the corporation on July 21, 1952, in order 
to assist this corporation in its compliance with re-
quirements of the Federal Housing Administration 
in the closing of its insured mortgage loan. 
Mr. Schnitzer then stated that in his opinion 
the purposes for which said contribution to the cap-
ital surplus had been made were now consummated 
and that it was no longer necessary that the cor-
poration retain said contribution. 
After some discussion, the directors being of 
the unanimous opinion that it was no longer nec-
essary that the corporation retain said capital con-
tribution, the corporation adopted the following res-
olution: 
RESOLVED, that since Harsh Utah Cor-
poration has received the benefits accruing 
from the advance of $624,994.00 to the corpora-
tion and that as it is no longer essential to the 
business of the corporation that in continue to 
retain said contribution, that the said capital 
contribution of $624,994.00 be returned to Mr. 
Schnitzer at this time, and that the books of 
the corporation be set up in such manner as to 
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4 
reflect the return of said contribution to the 
capital surplus of this corporation. 
HAROLD SCHNITZER 
WALTER E. HUTCHINSON 
Secretary 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
President 
(Exhibit P-4). 
Respondent deems it advisable to answer the points 
set out by petitioner numbering the said points as petitioner 
has numbered his points as follows: 
I. 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUP-
PORT THE FINDINGS OF THE DISCIPLIN-
ARY COMMITTEE TO THE EFFECT THAT 
PETITIONER DID NOT MAKE A DISCLOS-
URE OF THE FALSE TESTIMONY WITHIN 
A REASONABLE TIME FROM THE DATE OF 
SUCH FALSE TESTIMONY. 
I-A. 
PETITIONER WAS NOT JUSTIFIED IN 
REFRAINING FROM DIVULGING THE 
TRUTH REGARDING PERJURED TESTI-
MONY IN ORDER "TO MAINTAIN IN-
V I 0 L A T E THE CONFIDENCE" AND 
"PRESERVE THE SECRETS OF HIS CLI-
ENT" BECAUSE : 
(a) PETITIONER'S CLIENT HAD 
WAIVED THE PRIVILEGE PROHIB-
I i 
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ITING DISCLOSURE OF COMMUNI-
CAT I 0 N S BETWEEN ATTORNEY 
AND CLIENT; AND 
(b) PETITIONER'S FIRST D U T Y 
WAS TO COURT AND NOT TO CLI-
ENT. 
I-B. 
THE EVIDENCE DISCLOSES THAT PETI-
TIONER DELIBERATELY REFRAINED 
FROM DIVULGING THE TRUTH TO THE 
COURT IN THE TRIAL OF CASE NO. 5096, 
DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, 
CONCERNING PERJURED TESTIMONY 
GIVEN BY HAROLD J. SCHNITZER, ONE 
OF DEFENDANTS IN SAID CASE, AND 
WALTER E. HUTCHINSON, SECRETARY 
OF HARSH UTAH CORPORATION, ON 
JUNE 10, 1954, UNTIL EVIDENCE OF THE 
FALSITY OF SUCH TESTIMONY WAS 
PRESENTED TO THE COURT BY OPPOS-
ING PARTIES. 
II. 
THE EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS JUSTIFY 
THE CONCLUSION THAT PETITIONER VIO-
LATED THE PROVISIONS OF RULE III, SEC-
TION 32, SUBSECTIONS 15 AND 41, REVISED 
RULES OF THE UTAH STATE BAR, GOVERN-
ING PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND DISCI-
PLINE, AS WAS CONCLUDED BY THE DIS-
CIPLINARY COMMITTEE. 
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III. 
THE EVIDENCE SUSTAINS THE RECOM-
MENDATION OF THE BOARD OF BAR COM-
MISSIONERS THAT PETITIONER BE SUS-
PENDED FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW 
FOR A PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE EVIDENCE IS SUFFICIENT TO SUP-
PORT THE FINDINGS OF THE DISCIPLIN-
ARY COMMITTEE TO THE EFFECT THAT 
PETITIONER DID NOT MAKE A DISCLOS-
URE OF THE FALSE TESTIMONY WITHIN 
A REASONABLE TIME FROM THE DATE OF 
SUCH FALSE TESTIMONY. 
Petitioner says that his position at the hearing of this 
case was, and now is, that if he had a duty to disclose the 
facts to the court and counsel he did so within a reasonable 
time under all the facts and circumstances of the case 
(Petitioner's Brief, p. 11). 
The testimony of petitioner shows that he concluded 
on June lOth, during the lunch hour of that day, which 
was the day the perjury was committed, that the record 
should be corrected and set right. He said: 
"A. We concluded that the record should be 
corre·ted during the lunch hour, before we even got 
out of Wild Horse Charlie's, and that is what I told 
Mr. Hutchinson to do. I told him to correct that 
record and I told Mr. Schnitzer to do it too. 
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"Q. That was the lOth, wasn't it? 
"A. That was the day it occurred and there 
wasn't any ifs, ands or buts about that, and there 
wasn't any equivocation on the instructions. But 
they didn't correct the record that afternoon and 
that night we began to thresh around and try to 
resolve the problems we were confronted with" (R. 
pp. 0270-0271) . 
Petitioner's counsel stated: 
"When the opportunity came to present his case 
they corrected it" (R. 0063). 
And the following appears to be pertinent: 
"MR. COLTON: Is it your position that if the 
evidence is immaterial then it isn't the responsibility 
of counsel to disclose that even though it be imma-
terial? 
"MR. NIELSON: We take that position but we 
don't think we have to go that far. We say in any 
event Mr. King had that problem in his mind and 
he concluded he couldn't tell from what the authori-
ties said as to his duty as to whether it was to his 
client's advantage psychologically to disclose it all 
and he did it at the most reasonable opportunity 
when he thought he could gain some advantage from 
it and not have it pulled out piecemeal by someone 
on the opposition to make a big show about it" (R. 
0195). 
Also, Harold J. Schnitzer, petitioner's client, advised 
Mr. Hutchinson at the lunch hour on June lOth to tell the 
truth and honestly answer the qustions regarding the prep-
aration and signing of the two documents in question (the 
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Waiver and the Minutes containing the resolution). (Schnit-
zer's Deposition, pp. 13, 15 and 16.) 
If petitioner had sincerly desired to correct the record 
and reveal the truth concerning said perjured testimony, he 
had ample opportunity to do so prior to June 21st, the date 
that his witnesses Schnitzer and Hutchinson testified as 
to the falsity of their previous testimony given on June lOth. 
The record reveals that the perjury was committed by 
Schnitzer on the morning of June lOth (Exhibit P-1, pp. 
2 to 13, incl.) , and was committed by the witness Hutchin-
son on the afternoon of said day, June lOth (Exhibit P-1, 
pp. 14 to 23, incl.). Petitioner called the said witness Mr. 
Hutchinson to testify on the next day, June 11th, and ex-
amined him on said date on direct, redirect and further re-
direct examination (R. 0136). The 12th and 13th days of 
June, the year being 1954, were Saturday and Sunday (R. 
0135). On Monday, June 14th, the witnesses Miller and Ellis, 
the latter being an employee of defendants Schnitzer and 
Harsh Utah Corporation, and witness Goldberg were called 
and examined by counsel opposing petitioner and were cross 
examined by petitioner and petitioner then called and ex-
amined out of turn witness Isaacson (R. 0136 and R. 0139). 
On Tuesday, June 15th the aforesaid witness Ellis was 
called and examined by opposing counsel and cross exam-
ined by petitioner; later the aforesaid witness Goldberg 
was recalled and examined, then cross examined by peti-
tioner. On Wednesday, June 16th, witnesses Ellis and 
Weber were again called and examined by opposing counsel 
and petitioner cross examined witness Weber; plaintiff 
Locke was then called and examined by opposing counsel 
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and was cross examined by petitioner (R. 0137). On Thurs-
day, June 17th, witness Shipler, a photographer, and witness 
Goddard, a typewriting identity expert, were called by 
opposing counsel to identify the aforesaid Waiver and Min-
utes (R. 0138), both of whom were cross examined by peti-
tioner (R. 0139) ; defendant Schnitzer was then, said date 
being June 17th, called and examined by opposing counsel 
(R. 0139). On Friday, June 18th, defendant Schnitzer again 
took the witness stand and was examined further by oppos-
ing counsel, cross examined, and recross examined, by 
petitioner; then said witness Ellis was cross examined and 
recross examined by petitioner. In the afternoon on this 
day, June 18th, opposing counsel called and examined Mr. 
Don H. Terry, the police officer from the City of Pasadena, 
who testified regarding the installation by him of sound 
equipment in room 904, Hotel Utah, later occupied by de-
fendant Schnitzer and others and his listening to and re-
cording of conversations which took place in said room. 
Petitioner cross examined this witness (R. 0139-0140). June 
19th and 20th, 1954, were Saturday and Sunday. On Mon-
day, June 21st, petitioner cross examined and recross ex-
amined and further recross examined plaintiff Locke, a 
portion of which had to do with the recordings testified to 
by the aforesaid witness Terry (R. 0140). Then it was that 
on the afternoon of June 21st petitioner examined the said 
witnesses Schnitzer and Hutchinson, who then testified 
under oath as to the falsity of their previous testimony 
given on June lOth concerning the preparation and signing 
of the said Waiver and Minutes containing the resolution 
(Exhibit P-1, pp. 151-153 and 154-166 incl.). 
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I-A. 
PETITIONER WAS NOT JUSTIFIED IN 
REFRAINING FROM DIVULGING THE 
TRUTH REGARDING PERJURED TESTI-
MONY IN ORDER "TO MAINTAIN !N-
V I 0 LA T E THE CONFIDENCE" AND 
"PRESERVE THE SECRETS OF HIS CLI-
ENT" BECAUSE: 
(a) PETITIONER'S CLIENT HAD 
WAIVED THE PRIVILEGE PROHIB-
ITING DISCLOSURE OF COMMUNI-
CAT I 0 N S BETWEEN ATTORNEY 
AND CLIENT. 
The said deposition of petitioner's client, Schnitzer, 
(R. 0276) reveals that following the false testimony of 
Mr. Schnitzer at the noon recess on June lOth there was 
a conversation concerning the said false testimony between 
petitioner, Mr. Wayne Black, Mr. Hutchinson, Secretary 
of Harsh Utah Corporation, and Mr. Schnitzer at which 
they discussed the examination of Mr. Sherman concerning 
the preparation and signing of the aforesaid Waiver and 
Minutes, and petitioner then told Mr. Hutchinson that if 
he were questioned on the matter of these two documents he 
should not feel embarrassed about the fact that he had not 
prepared the minutes before coming to Salt Lake and to 
admit very honestly that he had neglected to do so and that 
he should very honestly answer the questions that Mr. Sher-
man gave without being ashamed of the fact that the min-
utes had not been prepared before. Mr. Schnitzer further 
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testified that he himself told Mr. Hutchinson that "Mr. 
King's advice was proper and that there was nothing wrong 
in having failed to do something of that nature, since no 
one was hurt and it had no bearing on the case" (Schnitzer 
Deposition, pp. 13, 15 and 16). 
Also, petitioner says that they had concluded that the 
record should be corrected during the lunch hour even be-
fore they got out of Wild Horse Charlie's, wb'ich was on 
the lOth of June, the day the perjury had been committed 
(R. 0270). 
Notwithstanding advice given to Mr. Hutchinson by 
petitioner and by Mr. Schnitzer, petitioner's client, to tell 
the whole truth on the afternoon of June lOth, this witness 
testified falsely concerning the preparation and signing 
of the said Waiver and Minutes thus corroborating the false 
testimony which Mr. Schnitzer previously gave that morn-
ing. 
From the foregoing, it would appear to be clear that 
at this juncture of the case (afternoon of June lOth) peti-
tioner's client, Mr. Schnitzer, had authorized that the whole 
truth concerning the preparation and signing of the said 
Waiver and Minutes should be divulged to the court and 
thus had waived any prohibition regarding the disclosure 
of the communications between him as client and petitioner 
as attorney. 
At 58 Am. Jur., pages 292-293, appears the following 
statement regarding communications between attorney and 
client, which appears to be the law on the said subject: 
"WITNESSES: The right to prohibit disclos-
ure of communication between attorney and client 
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12 
belongs to the client and not to the attorney. The 
privilege may be waived and the waiver may be 
either express or implied by the conduct of those 
entitled to its benefits." 
(b) PETITIONER'S FIRST D U T Y 
WAS TO COURT AND NOT TO CLI-
ENT. 
In thetJ.ight of the announced present position of peti-
tioner to the effect that he disclosed to the court the facts 
on which perjured testimony had been previously given 
within a reasonable time under all facts and circumstances 
of the case, it would appear that petitioner does not now 
seriously contend that his primary duty was to keep the 
confidences of his client and refrain from divulging the 
same to the court. 
It is well settled that the fidelity which a lawyer owes 
to his client must not be allowed to override the duty which 
devolves upon an attorney to deal honorably with the court 
of which he is an officer, and to inform it on the law and 
the facts of a case in which he appears; in Thornton on At-
torneys at Law, Vol. 2, p. 1235, Sec. 822, this duty on the 
part of a lawyer is recited and this authority further states 
that the lawyer violates his oath of office when he resorts 
to deception or permits his client to do so. (Italics added.) 
This authority further says: 
"An attorney is never justified in continuing a 
case after he has knowledge of the fact that it is 
being supported by perjured testimony; and if he 
proceeds with the trial thereafter, without acquaint-
ing the court of the fact that the testimony is false, 
and seeks to recover judgment on such testimony, 
his misconduct merits his disbarment." 
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We further call attention to the following provisions 
of Revised Rules of the Utah State Bar governing profes-
sional conduct and discipline which are pertinent, in addi-
tion to Rule III, Sec. 32, sub-paragraphs 15 and 41, upon 
which the said Disciplinary Committe relied, to-wit: 
"RULE II 
"Conduct Prescribed by Statute. 
Section 21. "It is the duty of an attorney and coun-
selor: 
"4. To employ, for the purpose of maintaining 
the causes confided to him, such means only as are 
consistent with truth, and never to seek to mislead 
the judges by any artifice or false statement of fact 
or law;" Title 78-51-31, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
Treble Damages. 
Section 22. "An attorney or counselor shall not: 
"5. Take part in deceit or collusion, or consent 
thereto with intent to deceive a court or judge or a 
party to an action or proceeding." Title 78-51-26, 
( 4), Utah Code Annotated 1953. 
"RULE III 
"Conduct Prescribed by Rule. 
Section 32. "The following Rules compr1s1ng the 
Canons of Ethics of the American Bar Association, 
together with such interpretations thereof as may 
be promulgated by the Board of Commissioners of 
the Utah State Bar with the approval of the Su-
preme Court, were promulgated and prescribed for 
the conduct of the members of the Utah State Bar: 
"* * * 
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"29. Upholding the Honor of the Profession. 
"* * * The counsel upon the trial of a cause 
in which perjury has been committed owe it to the 
profession and to the public to bring the matter to 
the knowledge of the prosecuting authorities." 
I-B. 
THE EVIDENCE DISCLOSES THAT PETI-
TIONER DELIBERATELY REFRAINED 
FROM DIVULGING THE TRUTH TO THE 
COURT IN THE TRIAL OF CASE NO. 5096, 
DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, 
CONCERNING PERJURED TESTIMONY 
GIVEN BY HAROLD J. SCHNITZER, ONE 
OF DEFENDANTS IN SAID CASE, AND 
WALTER E. HUTCHINSON, SECRETARY 
OF HARSH UTAH CORPORATION, ON 
JUNE 10, 1954, UNTIL EVIDENCE OF THE 
FALSITY OF SUCH TESTIMONY WAS 
PRESENTED TO THE COURT BY OPPOS-
ING PARTIES. 
Contrary to the aforesaid contentions of petitioner, the 
record reveals clearly that petitioner deliberately refrained 
from divulging the truth regarding the aforesaid perjured 
testimony until virtually forced to do so by the evidence 
submitted by his opposing counsel through the aforesaid 
witnesses Shipley, Goddard and Terry. In this regard at-
tention is directed to Exhibit P-3, which is the transcript 
of the hearing before the Utah State Bar Investigating Com-
mittee of the Third Division, consisting of five lawyers in 
said Division, held December 4, 1954. At this hearing peti-
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tioner made a voluntary statement under oath he being 
"interested in having the Committee here, hear what I have 
to say and at the earliest date possible" (Exhibit P-3, page 
6). 
After petitioner had explained in some detail what he 
considered to be the facts pertaining to the preparation and 
signing of the aforesaid Waiver of Notice and Minutes 
of Special Meeting of Directors of Harsh Utah Corporation 
and the false testimony submitted to the court by his client, 
Mr. Schnitzer, and by the witness, Mr. Hutchinson, Secre-
tary of the Harsh Utah Corporation, the following answers 
were made by petitioner to the following questions sub-
mitted by members of the said Committee : 
"MR. BOYLE: What was your feeling right 
after you had told Hutchinson, in no uncertain 
terms, you wanted him to tell the truth about this 
matter, and then in the afternoon session he com-
pletely disregarded your instructions? Did you have 
any feeling then you should inform the Court, or 
withdraw, or call a recess, or do anything of that 
kind? 
"MR. KING: I did not feel any responsibility 
for him. As I say, he is an attorney. I did not offer 
his testimony, and I disavowed it, and when we 
started our other case, the first two witnesses we 
put on,-Mr. Hutchinson and Mr. Schnitzer-and 
of course here the problem occurred. Some people 
said, 'We think that an attorney, when he was dis-
gusted, should have gotten up and said, 'Wait a 
minute now, that is false'". 
"Maybe I should have. I did not think about 
doing that at the time, either with Hutchinson or 
Schnitzer. I do not believe if I was examining, I 
would permit them to tell a lie, I knew was a lie, 
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and not make them correct it, while under my ex-
amination. 
"MR. BOYLE: You feel there is a substantial 
difference then in the fact Sherman was examining 
rather than you examining? 
"MR. KING: I do not think I had that feeling 
at that time. I-that is an after-thought. In other 
words, at that time I did not have this thing even 
thought out in my own mind, but, the question 
occurs to me, as I look back over it, I do not know 
whether I should have, on Schnitzer, said, 'Wait a 
minute now, you are either going to tell the truth 
or I am withdrawing as your counsel', or, 'That is 
false and perjured testimony you are giving there.' 
Maybe I had a duty as an attorney to confess to the 
Court a crime which he was committing in the pres-
ence of the Court. Maybe I had that duty, as far 
Mr. Hutchinson was concerned. I don't know, Mark. 
I was not Mr. Hutchinson's counsel, I did not in any 
way represent him at that time. I was Mr. Schnit-
zer's counsel, and the attorney-client relationship 
being such as it is, I did not believe, and I do not 
believe now, that I would have the superior duty to 
the Court or the superior duty to Mr. Schnitzer. 
"In other words, even though I knew, in the 
presence of the Court, he was committing a crime, 
if it was a crime, if perjury--even if I knew he was 
-I doubt as counsel, as long as I remain in this 
position, that I would have the superior duty to the 
Court. I think my duty to him is to protect his in-
terest and keep his conduct and conversation and 
disclosure to me confidential at all times-is super-
ior to my duty as an officer of the Court. 
"I base that on what Judge Murray said up 
here when we had one of these Bar Associations. He 
said, 'Well we all say a lawyer is an officer of the 
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Court, but he is primarily, and his first duty as an 
advocate and as counsel is for his client.' 
"Now so far as Mr. Schnitzer is concerned, that 
is my feeling about it, and I do not believe that I 
would have been justified in disavowing, or saying 
to the Court, 'Now wait a minute, Mr. Schnitzer, 
you are telling a lie under oath' and I don't know, 
Mr. Hutchinson is a little different than it is with 
Mr. Schnitzer, but with Hutchinson, he is an at-
torney. 
"MR. DRAPER: Didn't you, in fact, represent 
the corporation of which Mr. Schnitzer was Presi-
dent and Hutchinson was secretary? 
"MR. KING: Yes, I did, but I don't know-
does that make me represent Hutchinson? 
"MR. DRAPER: I do not know. 
"MR. BOYLE : This is not the place, probably, 
to argue the case. I would like to make this obser-
vation, and see what you think of it. It seems to me, 
under your explanation, that you feel your duty to 
your client, is superior to your duty to the Court 
under these circumstances. Doesn't that, in effect, 
do away with any question of having your witness 
or client give perjured testimony, if that duty over-
rides the duty to have him tell the truth, or see the 
truth is told ; then under those circumstances, there 
would be no objection to ever giving perjured testi-
mony through your own client? Certainly, that is 
not the situation we practice under. 
"MR. KING: That would be suborning a wit-
ness to testify falsely. The distinction, as I see it, 
Mark, is this. We did not tell, nor procure, nor ap-
prove, nor condescend, or even acquiesce in Mr. 
Schnitzer's telling false testimony. Mr. Black and 
I would never be a party to that, and it is not pos-
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sible. Anyone who would say we discussed that with 
him, or condoned what they were doing, if we were 
we would be, as I understand it, guilty of suborning 
a witness to perjury, even though our client. But 
once the client commits a crime in our presence, then 
do we have the duty to disclose all we know about 
the thing, and in effect, convict our own client? I 
don't know. If we do have, we did not perform that 
kind of a duty. Certainly at the moment he said he 
did not remember, we knew, if he was an ordinary 
person, he did remember. So, so far as knowing that 
he did, of course we did. 
"As I look back on it-of course hindsight is 
always better than foresight-as I look back on it, 
there may have been-we may have been able to 
prevent it by getting up and saying, 'If you want 
to know about that, why that was prepared this 
morning' and so on, but it did not occur to us at that 
time-it did not occur to me at that time, because 
this thing came so-well sort of slid out of Schnit-
zer. He was always leading up to a certain point, 
and then he was all the way in" (Exhibit P-3, pps. 
36, 37, 38, 39). 
Later at the said hearing petitioner made the following 
answers to the following questions regarding his failure to 
"set the record straight", to-wit: 
"MR. KING: We knew all of the time that 
what he was saying was not a fact. 
"MR. HATCH : Was there any discussion be-
tween you and Schnitzer and Hutchinson as to the 
possibility of setting the record straight as to that 
date? 
"MR. KING: I did so remark on it myself. I 
think right after, within the next day or so, and 
discussed it with Mr. Roberts. I do not know if he 
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will remember or- not. I did discuss it though, as to 
whether- or not it would do us any good to have these 
witnesses go back on the witness stand and correct 
their testimony, and I did my research and discov-
er-ed that a very serious conflict of authority and one 
authority said it did not do a damned bit of good to 
put him back and have him correct it, and the Su-
preme Court of the United States in a case involving 
a Senator from Nebraska has held (Senator Norris) 
that since the word is out, it does not do you any 
good to correct it at all. (Italics supplied.) 
"MR. CROFT: What do you mean it does not 
do you any good? 
"MR. KING: It does not purge your report. 
"MR. CROFT : It did not remove the perjury 
from the record? 
"MR. KING: That is right, it does not purge 
the record of the false statement to correct it, and 
with that in mind, we did not want to jeopardize Mr. 
Schnitzer, by having it go in and admit that he made 
false statements; and Mr. Hutchinson, likewise, was 
jeopardizing them both, so with that in mind, we 
could see there wasn't-as far as correcting it, it 
would not be clearly remov.ed-would not remove the 
perjury from the record. (Italics added.) 
"MR. DRAPER: Why didn't you put them on 
after it broke, to admit all these things? 
"MR. KING: Afterwards, once the fat was in 
the fire, then of course, it was to their interest to 
admit it; even though it did not purge the record, it 
would make for a much more salutary defense before 
any jury, if they had admitted it. In other words, 
we could not do them any damage then. The proof 
was in that they had committed perjury, but before 
that time, it would have been very seriously preju-
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dicial to have them go back on and admit they had 
committed this so-called crime, and in an effort to 
purge the record, when it would not be purged, ac-
cording to the Supreme Court of the United States" 
(Exhibit P-3, pp. 68 and 69). (Italics added.) 
The following further took place at said hearing: 
"MR. HATCH: After thinking this over, and 
reconsidering on the matter of the perjury, you de-
termined in your own opinion, your duty was to pro-
tect your client against a criminal aspect regardless 
of the way it would affect others? 
"MR. KING: I don't think hardly that is what; 
I still thought, and I still am of the opinion, that this 
was an immaterial matter, and I considered it my 
duty not to jeopardize, unnecessarily, perhaps, their 
interests. Frankly-and I don't now-frankly be-
lieve that this particular fact has any materiality at 
all in the trial of this lawsuit, nor would have af-
fected Judge Cowley's decision one way or the other. 
It should not have. It didn't make any difference, so 
I concluded, after my research, that to put them 
back on, would serve no purpose, so far as they were 
concerned, and would seriously jeopardize their po-
sition" (Exhibit p .. 3, p. 70). 
Petitioner further testified at the hearing before the 
Disciplinary Committee as follows: 
"A. No, I don't think we didn't know which 
way to turn. We were very much aware that these 
men were in an extremely dangerous position. That 
they were men of substance and character in the 
community and there was a very difficult problem. 
First we had this job of informing the court con-
cerning the truth of the matter and as a secondary 
consideration we had the welfare of Mr. Hutchin-
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son. You might not know it but he is about sixty 
years old, a very dignified appearing person, and 
an intelligent man and I considered very carefully 
the course we were to take" (R. 0270). 
The aforesaid statements of petitioner reveal conclu-
sively that petitioner, after deliberation and careful con-
sideration, concluded that he had the primary duty to his 
client to retain the confidences of his client which he did 
until "once the fat was in the fire", referring, it would 
appear, to the evidence adduced by the opposition regarding 
the perjured testimony, after which petitioner considered 
it to be in his client's interest to admit the false statements 
even though such admission did not purge the record, ac-
cording to the holding in the aforesaid Norris case ( U. S. 
v. Norris, 300 U. S. 564). 
Bearing out petitioner's above statements, and contrary 
to his present announced position, petitioner continued to 
resist the introduction of evidence to correct the record 
until it became entirely clear, through evidence adduced by 
his opposition, as to the perjured testimony of witnesses 
Schnitzer and Hutchinson. 
Through the testimony of both witnesses Shipler, the 
photographer, and Goddard the typewriter expert, on June 
18th, petitioner refrained from revealing the complete truth 
to clear the record of perjury. During the testimony of the 
said witness Goddard, petitioner stated : 
"MR. KING: I don't want to interfere, but as 
to the typewriter, I think Mr. Hutchinson left our 
office and dictated those minutes. 
"MR. SHERMAN: On what date, and what 
type of stipulation would you like to make? 
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"MR. KING: I don't know when he did it, or 
the exact date. 
"MR. SHERMAN : I will continue with the ex-
amination, unless you want to make a complete stip-
ulation the documents were prepared by Mr. Hutch-
inson, yourself, Mr. Black and Mr. Schnitzer in your 
office. 
"MR. KING: Mr. Hutchinson, I understand-
(sentence not completed by Mr. King). 
"MR. SHERMAN : I offer the stipulation, and 
you can either leave or take it, that stipulation is 
that you, yourself, and Mr. Schnitzer, Mr. Black 
and Mr. Hutchinson were there? 
"MR. KING: I won't stipulate to that. I had 
nothing to do with preparing the minute. 
"MR. SHERMAN : Your contention is you had 
nothing to do with it? 
"MR. KING: I knew Mr. Hutchinson was going 
to use our girl to do it. 
"MR. SHERMAN : It was done last week in 
your office? 
"MR. KING: It was done about on the 5th. 
"MR. SHERMAN : I will continue the examina-
tion for the purpose of the record, I would prefer 
to have it testified to. 
"MR. KING: 0. K. 
"THE COURT: Go ahead" (Exhibit P-2, pages 
224 and 225) . 
On June 18th, in the afternoon, the aforesaid detective, 
Don H. Terry of Pasadena, California, testified of the in-
stalling by him of sound equipment in Room 904 of the 
Hotel Utah on the night of June 6th and of his exclusive 
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operation and control of the same to the date of his testi-
mony. He listened and made recordings of conversations 
which took place in the said room from June 7th to June 
18th (Exhibit P-1, pp. 52 to 54). 
Petitioner objected to the testimony of Mr. Terry as 
being unlawfully obtained (Exhibit P-1, p. 55). There was 
discussion as to the admissibility of such evidence and the 
court held it to be admissible (Exhibit P-1, p. 60). It was 
agreed to produce the records from which the transcription 
was taken (Exhibit P-1, p. 60). Petitioner thereafter 
stated: 
"MR. KING: I want that platter on which 
you have that I was ever mentioned or any word 
was ever said to me in that room, and I want it right 
now. 
"Q. You'll have it, Mr. King, and it will show 
you and Mr. Walter Hutchinson were in a conversa-
tion about the resolution, to leave and go to your 
office and prepare it. 
"MR. KING: It won't, Mr. Sherman. 
"Q. We'll get that Mr. King. We have it" (Ex-
hibit P-1, p. 63). 
Again petitioner objected to the testimony of Mr. 
Terry on the basis of attorney-client relationship. He said: 
"MR. KING: We are resisting, your Honor, 
the admission of this evidence on the ground that 
it's in violation of the rights of the parties. We 
would also call the court's attention to another right 
that has been violated, and that the privilege of at-
torney-client relationship, especially with Mr. 
Schnitzer, and we object" (Exhibit P-1, p. 64-4). 
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Again petitioner objected to the testimony of Mr. Terry 
on the basis of attorney-client relationship as follows: 
"Q. And can you identify who was in the room 
at that time? 
"THE COURT: What time did you say? 
"A. 8:47 A. M. June lOth. 
"Q. And who was in the room at that time? 
"A. Mr. King, Mr. Hutchinson, Mr. Schnitzer; 
and Mr. King, Mr. Hutchinson and Mr. Schnitzer. 
"Q. All right. Will you state what was said? 
"A. Mr. King said: 'Using all of this, * * *' 
"MR. KING: (interposing) We are not waiv-
ing any objection, including attorney-client relation-
ship to this conversation. Go ahead" (Exhibit P-1, 
pp. 65 and 66). 
II. 
THE EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS JUSTIFY 
THE CONCLUSION THAT PETITIONER VIO-
LATED THE PROVISIONS OF RULE III, SEC-
TION 32, SUBSECTIONS 15 AND 41, REVISED 
RULES OF THE UTAH STATE BAR, GOVERN-
ING PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT AND DISCI-
PLINE, AS WAS CONCLUDED BY THE DIS-
CIPLINARY COMMITTEE. 
Petitioner has quoted the subsections involved and fur-
ther quotation appears unnecessary. 
With the said subsections in mind, the following cases 
appear to be in point in this matter: 
People v. Beattie (Ill.) 27 N. E. 1096. 
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In this case the lawyer involved drew a complaint in 
divorce falsely stating his client was a resident of Illinois 
and allowed her to testify, though he knew the same to be 
false. He also introduced other evidence that would have 
been inadmissible if his client had not given such false testi-
mony. While the activities of Mr. Beattie were shown to be 
of such a nature as to cause the court to conclude that he 
"procured" false evidence, and in that sense may be beyond 
the facts in the instant case, the court comments on his 
sitting by and allowing his client to testify falsely and said 
on page 1103: 
"The lawyer's duty is of a double character. He 
owes his client the duty of fidelity, but he also owes 
the duty of good faith and honorable dealing to the 
judicial tribunals before whom he practices his pro-
fession. He is an officer of the court-a minister 
in the temple of justice. His high vocation is to cor-
rectly inform the court upon the law and the facts 
of the case, and to aid it in doing justice and arriv-
ing at correct conclusions. He violates his oath of 
office when he resorts to deception or permits his 
clients to do so." (Italics added.) 
In Re Mendelsohn, 135 N. Y. S. 438 (1912), the attor-
ney's father-in-law testified falsely and the attorney con-
ducting the trial heard this testimony without attempting to 
correct it, but allowed the trial to continue without calling 
any attention to the fact that the witness was testifying 
falsely. The attorney stated that he was so shocked at hear-
ing the false testimony and by the realization of the fact 
that the witness was guilty of perjury that he lost his head 
and so did not attempt to correct the erroneous testimony. 
The court described this as indefensible. 
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On page 441 the court said: 
"This is too flagrant a violation of the duty im-
posed upon an attorney and counselor at law by his 
acceptance of the office to overlook. If he was will-
ing to sacrifice his professional duty to save his 
father-in-law from danger because of the crime that 
he had committed, he certainly is not a proper per-
son to be a member of the profession.-We concur 
with the referee in stating that his explanation is 
absolutely unsatisfactory, that it really explained 
nothing, and that his misconduct stands out in bold 
relief without excuse or palliation." 
In re Taylor (Ky.) 189 S. W. (2d) 403 (1945). Taylor 
a lawyer in Kentucky, who had had considerable trouble 
and bore a bad reputation, permitted a lady to testify falsely 
that she was his wife and to procure a divorce and then 
endeavored to have the decree entered, knowing the testi-
mony to be false. He later explained that he had boarded 
at the home of this lady and it had been rumored in the 
community that they were married and she wanted a di-
vorce because "that will make it all right and keep down 
suspicion, and protect my reputation". For this reason he 
had consented to the proceedings and declined to cross ex-
amine her, she being represented by counsel. On page 404 
the court said : 
"There is no occasion to hunt through the law 
books for authorities to support the conclusion that 
the conduct of the respondent was reprehensible and 
in violation of his obligation as a member of the bar. 
He is guilty of deceit and assisting to perpetrate a 
fraud upon the court. There is no condonation. The 
respondent's explanation is weak-. Is this conduct 
not as reprehensible as knowingly exhibiting to the 
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court false affidavits in an effort to obtain some 
advantage for a client or knowingly and deliberately 
presenting perjured testimony; or having a certifi-
cate to a legal paper falsely executed? These have 
been deemed sufficient causes for disbarment", 
and cites 5 Am. Jur., Attorneys at Law, Sections 262 and 
263. The court also cites the annotation at 14 A. L. R. 868. 
In quoting from the above indicated Beattie case the court 
said that a lawyer "owes the duty of good faith and honor-
able dealing to the judicial tribunals before whom he prac-
tices his profession. He is an officer of the court,-a min-
ister in the temple of justice. His high vocation is to cor-
rectly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the 
case, and to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct 
conclusions. He violates his oath of office when he resorts 
to deception or permits his clients to do so." (Italics added.) 
In Re Goodrich (Vt.) 11 A. (2d) 325. In this case the 
attorney prepared, or caused to be prepared, a "libel for 
divorce" in which plaintiff alleged and later testified in 
court that "during said coveture she on her part had faith-
fully kept the marriage covenant and performed all of the 
duties appertaining thereto" and the attorney well knew 
she had previously entered a plea of guilty to adultery. The 
attorney claimed he did not know or realize the law of 
Vermont prevented a person from getting a divorce on any 
ground .who had been guilty of adultery. On page 326 the 
court said: 
"There is nothing in the duty of diligence which 
a lawyer owes to his client which in any way makes 
it necessary, under any circumstances, for him to 
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practice, or permit to be practiced, a fraud on the 
court." (Italics added.) 
Annotation 14 A. L. R. 868, Attorneys, Presenting or 
permitting false evidence as ground for disbarment or sus-
pension. At this citation appears the following general 
statement: 
"It cannot be tolerated that an attorney present 
or permit (italics added) evidence, pleadings, or 
affidavits on behalf of his client which he knows to 
be false. And such misconduct is ample ground for 
disbarment." 
There is cited the case of In re: Hardenbrook, 121 N. Y. S. 
250, in which it was held that an attorney, who was not the 
attorney of record, who proceeded with a trial in silence 
after discovering that his client had testified falsely and 
that her claim was based upon such perjured testimony, 
should be disbarred. In that case the court said : 
263: 
"* * * Nor is it essential, in order that the 
disciplinary powers of the court may be exercised, 
that the attorney should be guilty of a violation of 
the penal law; but it is sufficient if it appears that 
he had a direct know ledge of the fact that his client 
sought to recover on perjured testimony, and, not-
withstanding such relief, continued the suit and in-
sisted on recovery." 
5 Am. Jur., Attorneys at Law, page 419, paragraph 
"An attorney may be suspended or disbarred 
for-offering in evidence as valid an instrument 
which he knows is not valid and lawful-for using 
as evidence documents known by him to be fabri-
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cated, or testimony known to him to be false and 
perjured." 
In re Carroll (Ky.) (1951)-244 S. W. (2d) 474, an 
attorney was charged with the violation of Canon No. 41 
of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American Bar 
Association which require a lawyer to rectify discovered 
fraud or deception used to impose unjustly upon the court 
or a party. Said Canon 41 is the same as our Rule III (Con-
duct Prescribed by Rule), Section 32, paragraph 41. 
The attorney involved represented the husband in a di-
vorce action before the court and when his client was asked 
concerning his property he testified that he owned no prop-
erty whatsoever excepting an old automobile. This answer 
was false and the attorney knew it to be false because the 
attorney was then holding real property in trust for the 
client. On page 4 7 4 the court states: 
"Under any standard of proper ethical conduct 
an attorney should not sit by silently and permit his 
client to commit what may have been perjury and 
which certainly would mislead the court and the op-
posing party of a matter vital to the• issue under 
consideration", 
and cites In re Taylor (Ky.) 189 S. W. (2d) 403. 
Respondent claimed, among other defenses : 
(1) That he had a duty not to divulge the con-
fidence of his client ; 
(2) That the matter involved was immaterial, 
and 
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(3) That he did not violate Canon 41 because 
the opposing party knew that Robinson 
was claiming an interest in the property 
concerned. 
Concerning defense (1) the court said on page 475: 
"This duty to the client, of course, does not 
extend to the point of authorizing collaboration with 
him in the commission of fraud." 
On defense (2) the court held it was the duty of the 
husband to make a full disclosure and said on page 475: 
"Even if we could say that the false testimony 
of Robinson did not affect the award, it was still 
fraud upon the court and the opposing party." 
Concerning defense (3) the court stated on page 475: 
"It may be true that prior to the hearing, in 
connection with another matter, respondent and op-
posing counsel had discussed the question of whether 
or not Robinson was actually the owner, * * * 
Both he and the court had a right to rely upon Rob-
inson's sworn testimony. Any proper sense of fair 
dealing would have impelled respondent at least to 
state for the record and for the court's information 
the fact that a controversy existed on the question 
of ownership." 
In re Hargis, (Ky.) (1945), 190 S. W. (2d) 333. The 
attorney in this case claimed that he did not know his client 
and a witness for his client had testified falsely regarding 
the client's residence in Kentucky (as he was later shown 
to have resided in Ohio) until after the divorce proceedings 
were heard but before the court entered judgment and did 
not divulge to the court the fact because he understood a 
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reconciliation between the parties was likely. The court 
said on page 338 : 
"That the respondent made no such disclosure to 
the court, tends to confirm the conclusion of the trial 
committee that the respondent himself was a party 
to the attempted fraud on the court from its incep-
tion. But whether that be so or not, respondent has 
clearly shown by his own testimony that he became 
a party to his client's attempted fraud when, ad-
mittedly in possession of the facts, he failed to dis-
close them to the court." 
Petitioner cites the case of In re Hoover (Ariz. 1935) 
46 P. (2) 647 to support his position and quotes therefrom 
on page 34 of petitioner's brief. While the Supreme Court 
of Arizona did not think that the attorney's conduct mer-
ited disbarment, suspension or reproval, such conclusion 
appears to have been based upon the attorney's inexperience 
and lack of ethical appreciation, that court having stated: 
"Plainly it was respondent's duty, when his cli-
ent incorrectly and falsely stated that he bought the 
medicine himself, to endeavor by questions put to 
him to elicit the correct and truthful answer. This 
duty he owed to his client, to the court, and to him-
self. While a lawyer owes the duty to his client of 
seeing that his rights are fully protected under the 
forms of the law, he is never justified in imposing 
upon the court or knowingly permitting his client to 
do so by testifying falsely. We think that an exper-
ienced right-thinking lawyer, under the circum-
stances, would have felt impelled to take steps, be-
fore his client left the witness stand or during the 
trial, to have him correct his testimony. * '~ * 
We are satisfied if like circumstances ever arise in 
his practice he will act more ethically and more 
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wisely." (Italics added.) (Pp. 649-650 of above ci-
tation.) 
III. 
THE EVIDENCE SUSTAINS THE RECOM-
MENDATION OF THE BOARD OF BAR COM-
MISSIONERS THAT PETITIONER BE SUS-
PENDED FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW 
FOR A PERIOD OF SIX MONTHS. 
Respondent takes the position in this matter that the 
offense of which petitioner is charged is of sufficient ser-
iousness to warrant careful consideration by the court. The 
quantum of punishment, however, is a matter within the 
discretion of the court. In the light of the facts, cases and 
rules submitted it appears that the recommendation of the 
Bar Commissioners should be sustained. 
Petitioner places considerable emphasis on the state-
ment of Mr. Black, associate attorney of Mr. King, quoted 
on pages 47 and 48 of petitioner's brief, in which Mr. Black 
indicates he has yet to see one single counsel stand forth 
immediately and without question, either before the court 
or in the chamber of the court, and denounce the perjury, 
-suggests that if such procedure be proper "we ought to 
be educated to that fact", and further says that he knows 
"of no such counsel who has such a shining armor of virtue 
that he has been doing that in this community or in any 
other community". 
Respondent does not have either the disposition or the 
means of refuting this statement, since it appears to be 
based upon Mr. Black's own experience, but it should be 
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pointed out that Mr. Black is not entirely disinterested in 
this matter and appears to be endeavoring to find excuse 
rather than approval for petitioner's acts. His view does 
not appear to be shared by all attorneys in this vicinity, 
as appears from the recommendation of the Investigating 
Committee (R. 0006 and 0007), the findings and conclu-
sions of the Disciplinary Committee (R. 0279 to 0281) and 
the recommendation of the Board of Bar Commissioners 
(R. 0282), Utah State Bar, all being made up of attorneys 
at law practicing in this community. The statement to peti-
tioner of Mr. Boyle, Chairman of the aforesaid Investigat-
ing Committee, in this regard deserves emphasis: 
"MR. BOYLE: This is not the place, probably, to 
argue the case. I would like to make this observa-
tion, and see what you think of it. It seems to me, 
under your explanation, that you feel your duty to 
your client, is superior to your duty to the Court 
under these circumstances. Doesn't that, in effect, 
do away with any question of having your witness 
or client give perjured testimony, if that duty over-
rides the duty to have him tell the truth, or see the 
truth is told; then under those circumstances, there 
would be no objection to ever giving perjured testi-
mony through your own client? Certainly, that is 
not the situation we practice under" (Exhibit P-3, 
p. 38). 
Petitioner told the Investigating Committee of the Bar 
that "Mr. Schnitzer had destroyed any confidence the court 
could have had prior to June lOth and on too numerous oc-
casions to mention, simply by saying 'I don't know, I don't 
remember, God, I forgot.' He was just hedging, dodging 
and equivocating." Mr. King told him to be honest and 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
34 
state his position frankly "Because if you do not you are 
going to destroy the confidence of the court in you and if 
you destroy the confidence of the court in you, our chance 
of getting fair and adequate consideration of your case is 
destroyed by the same token" (Ex. P -3, pages 23-24) . 
On June 9th, Mr. John Sherman, attorney for Mr. 
Locke, had called Mr. Schnitzer under the rule governing 
examination of adverse witnesses. On the morning of June 
lOth, at the time when Mr. Schnitzer resumed the witness 
stand for testimony, Mr. Sherman stated into the record 
"Now you have been able to locate-! believe 
your testimony was yesterday, that there were min-
utes of the directors meeting and that they were 
held in Portland and that you had them at the hotel. 
"Answer: (By Schnitzer) "We are glad to 
produce them this morning" (Ex. P-1, page 27). 
On the evening of June 9th, Mr. Hutchinson, who was 
an attorney at law and was secretary of Harsh Utah Cor-
poration, a resident of Portland, Oregon, arrived in Salt 
Lake City from Portland, to be a witness in the case at 
the request of Mr. Schnitzer. Apparently Mr. Hutchinson 
had not been in Salt Lake City during the trial prior to this 
time and he again left Salt Lake on the 11th of June, (after 
testifying at the instance of petitioner on June 11th), re-
turning to testify on June 21st. 
In view of the fact that Mr. King had lost confidence 
in Mr. Schnitzer's willingness to tell the truth without eva-
sion or perjury, it would appear that petitioner was not 
justified in reposing too much confidence in what Mr. 
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Schnitzer might do. Under these circumstances, Mr. King 
was called to the Hotel Utah to have breakfast with Schnit-
zer, Hutchinson and others on the morning of June lOth. 
It was at that time and place that it was decided that it 
was necessary to prepare minutes and a waiver in Mr. 
King's office that morning before going to court at Farm-
ington. Mr. King knew that minutes and a waiver were 
being prepared covering a meeting held some time prior 
thereto in Portland, Oregon. The waiver of notice and the 
minutes containing the resolution of Harsh Utah Corpora-
tion are signed by Harold Schnitzer, president, and W. E. 
Hutchinson as secretary, and while the minutes do not show 
on their face the date of their preparation, the waiver is 
dated April 1, 1953. 
When Mr. Schnitzer went on the stand on June lOth 
he took these documents with him and they were introduced 
in evidence as part of the minutes of the corporation, then 
Mr. King told the court that these were part of Mr. Hutch-
inson's files (Ex. P-1, page 2-3). 
Though it may appear from the record that petitioner 
did not specifically advise Mr. Schnitzer and Mr. Hutchin-
son to testify that the documents had been prepared and 
signed at a time prior to June lOth, the date of said prepa-
ration and signing, it is clear that if Mr. King had given 
the matter careful consideration before the documents were 
introduced in court, he should have anticipated that Schnit-
zer was going to try to leave the impression with the court 
that these documents had been prepared and signed in 
Portland, Oregon at a previous date. 
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If Mr. King had examined the documents prepared in 
his office on the morning of June lOth, and particularly 
the waiver of notice, it would be apparent that if nothing 
were said about the point by any witness the court would 
assume the document was signed on April 1, 1953, and that 
therefore it had been in existence prior to that date. 
Before the minutes and waiver relating to the meeting 
of April 1, 1953 were introduced in evidence they were 
stapled into a book which contained the minutes of the 
corporation and it seems apparent that if petitioner had 
given the matter any thought and knowing as he did, that 
he had an unreliable witness, he should have examined the 
documents prepared in his office before they were intro-
duced in evidence by his client. If, as petitioner claims, he 
was taken by surprise and was shocked when Mr. Schnitzer 
testified falsely regarding the documents, it seems reason-
able to believe he would have taken a different course of 
conduct than he did at some time between that date and 
June 21st when Mr. Schnitzer and Mr. Hutchinson came 
back on the stand to correct their testimony. It is probably 
the fact to state that neither Schnitzer nor petitioner 
thought Schnitzer would be subjected to such a penetrating 
cross examination as he was given by Mr. Sherman. 
The record indicates that Mr. Sherman was dealing 
with a very difficult witness in Mr. Schnitzer, and petitioner 
confirms his appraisal of his unwillingness to state the 
facts under oath. This Court is not called upon to pass upon 
whether Mr. Sherman was or was not justified in putting 
a listening device in Mr. Schnitzer's room. Certainly the 
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conduct of Mr. Sherman is not before this court for ap-
praisal. 
The records support the inference that Mr. Schnitzer 
and Mr. Hutchinson went to court on the morning of June 
lOth with the hope of having the court believe that the min-
utes and waiver had been prepared and signed in Oregon, the 
waiver on or prior to Aprill, 1953, and the minutes at some 
time shortly thereafter. It probably did not occur to Mr. 
Schnitzer or Mr. Hutchinson or to petitioner, that Mr. Sher-
man was going to ask them about the details of the transac-
tion and then be able to prove so clearly that they had per-
jured themselves. 
It would appear that, in view of the fact that petitioner 
knew he had an unreliable witness and had documents pre-
pared in his office the morning of June lOth which were 
going to be produced in court that day by his evasive client 
(and it must be remembered that petitioner himself joined 
in the production of these documents) , the least petitioner 
could be expected to have done was to examine the docu-
ments to be introduced. 
While the Supreme Court of Utah has held that the 
perjury was upon an immaterial matter, the permitting by 
petitioner of his client Schnitzer and witness Hutchinson to 
prepare documents in his office under circumstances which 
indicate that the said Schnitzer and Hutchinson would 
likely evade the fact of preparation and also the time and 
place thereof in the hope that the court would assume with-
out Sherman's examination that the documents were pre-
pared and signed in Portland on or about April 1, 1953, 
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and then to testify as they did regarding said documents, 
would appear to indicate a failure on the part of petitioner 
to appreciate his duties and obligations as an attorney and 
officer of the court, as expected by the Revised Rules of 
the Utah State Bar Governing Professional Conduct and 
Discipline involved herein. 
CONCLUSION 
By way of conclusion it may be appropriate for respon-
dent to state further that assuming Mr. King and Mr. Black, 
Mr. Schnitzer and Mr. Hutchinson held the conference tes-
tified to by Mr. King, Mr. Black and Mr. Schnitzer, as here-
tofore set out, during the lunch hour on June 10, 1954, at 
which it was agreed that if Hutchinson was asked about 
the preparation of the Waiver and Minutes he was instruc-
ted by both Mr. King and Mr. Schnitzer that he was to tell 
the complete truth, it seems hard to understand why peti-
tioner did not stand up before the Court while the witness 
Hutchinson was lying about the matter, on the afternoon 
of June lOth, and frankly disclose that the documents were 
prepared in his office, using his typewriter and stenogra-
pher, on the morning of June lOth. It is hard to understand 
that if petitioner and Mr. Black gave the positive and vig-
orous criticism to Mr. Schnitzer, according to their testi-
mony, they would have nevertheless remained silent when 
Mr. Hutchinson proceeded to evade and perjure himself 
on the same matter in the afternoon. 
There is much discussion in the record by petitioner 
and Mr. Black about their uncertainty as to when they 
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should disclose the truth to the court because they did not 
wish to have their client Schnitzer and his secretary, Hutch-
inson, admit they were guilty of perjury, but if we are to 
believe that they instructed Hutchinson to tell the truth 
on the afternoon of June lOth that question, as we have 
heretofore stated, had been resolved in favor of full and 
fair disclosure on June lOth. The logical conclusion to be 
reached from this state of facts is that either petitioner did 
not advise witness Hutchinson to tell the truth on the after-
noon of June lOth, or if he did and that advice was disre-
garded, it was his duty, as an attorney, at that point to 
make a full disclosure to the court. Because of what ac-
tually transpired, it is apparent that Mr. King and Mr. 
Black were not vitally concerned about the perjury of their 
witnesses until that perjury was proven by Mr. Sherman's 
independent evidence which was produced June 17th and 
18th. 
Respondent respectfully suggests to the Court that 
petitioner should have disclosed the facts on June lOth and 
on each trial date thereafter until June 21st. In the short 
space of a page of testimony (Exhibit P-2, page 224) there 
are two misstatements of fact by petitioner,-one, that Mr. 
Hutchinson "left our office and dictated those minutes," 
and two, "that it was done about on the 5th". Petitioner 
was not only failing to disclose the facts to the court but 
was continuing in his efforts to conceal or evade the truth. 
The fact that the difference between June lOth and June 
5th and whether the dictation was in or out of Mr. King's 
office may be immaterial to the issues in the lawsuit gives 
added reason for him to state the facts. 
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Respondent submits that the facts and law pertaining 
to this matter appear to amply justify the sustaining by 
this court of the findings and conclusions of the Disciplin-
ary Committee and the recommendation of the Board of 
Bar Commissioners. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LLEWELLYN 0. THOMAS, 
ALLAN E. MECHAM, 
Prosecuting Committee, 
Utah State Bar. 
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